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"Cruel and Unusual" Checks and Balances: The
Supreme Court Writes a Rubber Check
The Constitution provides a check on the powers of Congress
and the executive branch in the form of the judiciary branch.
Under its power to interpret, or reinterpret, the various provisions
of the Constitution, how far may the United States Supreme Court
go in divesting individual guarantees? For example, once the Court
acknowledges the existence of a guarantee, such as a prohibition
against a state-established religion or a right to interstate travel,
may the Court simply reverse itself?
The checks and balances the framers of the Constitution in-
tended when they drafted the document establishing an indepen-
dent judiciary, as shown by history, have survived many drastic
changes of circumstances. This comment examines the evolution of
the "check" on "cruel and unusual punishment" as applied
through the institution of the United States Supreme Court. It is
in this Eighth Amendment context that a contemporary perspec-
tive now shows the judicial branch acts only to slow, and not to
prevent, the application of majority will. A patient majority may
be annoyed, perhaps, but will not ultimately be frustrated by the
constitutional protections afforded to the minority. This is because
the United States Supreme Court appears to limit the application
of the death penalty when the majority demands it, and to curtail
those same constitutional protections when they prove unpopular.
While doubtful capital cases in the past have been resolved in
favor of life, a recent case, Blystone v Pennsylvania,1 which was
poised on the fulcrum of equilibrium between life and death, tilted
to death.
This effect of friction on popular will is arguably the most desir-
able role for an un-elected branch in a democracy. This comment,
however, attempts to demonstrate that if judicial constitutional re-
view mirrors popular opinion in an inexact way, we are deluded to
think there is substance in the individual protections of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. One example of how pro-
tections can be curtailed by popular opinion is shown by the long
1. 494 US 299 (1990).
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history of prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. An
examination of the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
even allows us to do a certain amount of extrapolation which indi-
cates that other constitutional protections may be subject to popu-
lar opinion as well. If protections can be diminished by the judici-
ary under the guise of a "living" or "evolving" Constitution, as the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, then
they are certainly not absolute protections.
Death penalty constitutional jurisprudence is an important and
highly visible illustration. When the Bill of Rights was adopted,
there was no question that "cruel and unusual" punishment did
not encompass the death penalty. While this is true even today,
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does prevent
certain applications of the ultimate sanction. Even pre-constitu-
tional common law prevented the government from executing or
even judging a person guilty when the perpetrator was found to be
mentally incompetent. This comment discusses several cases which
have strayed far from that doctrine.
As standards of decency "evolved," in accordance with the con-
cept of an evolving Constitution, and all other western democracies
abolished the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded the constitutional protections afforded capital defendants
in this country. Now, with the death penalty enjoying a resurgence
of popular support both among the general population and, as re-
flected in recent opinions, among the members of the Court, an
expansion of the application of the penalty is underway which will
not be limited by the Constitution, but only by the yet-to-be-ex-
plored limits of what the majority will tolerate.
The arena of Eighth Amendment conflict has, in the past twenty
years, been the tension between state legislatures' mandates in
death penalty statutes poised against jury discretion in sentencing
murderers to death. The earlier statutes tended to give juries a free
hand in setting penalties. This comment describes the fundamen-
tal changes to that system that occurred when, faced with both
peaceful and deadly violent protests against unequal treatment of
classes and races, the United States Supreme Court found unbri-
dled jury discretion to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
This comment's discussion then narrows to very recent cases de-
ciding the limits placed on legislatures when they attempt to de-
fine "aggravating circumstances."
A brief overview of the history of the death penalty in America
and a consideration of the recent deviations from protections
-938 Vol. 30:937
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against capricious application shows the Court leaving the expan-
sion of protections in the past and, in the more recent past, turn-
ing headlong into the murky waters of the ultimate sanction.
THE HISTORY
The death penalty in America has to some extent always re-
flected the democratic process. A survey of the death penalty's his-
tory in America reveals that it has been enforced in great measure
to the extent demanded or prohibited by public opinion.2 Esti-
mates are that as many as 18,000 to 20,000 people have been le-
gally executed in the United States and the colonies.3
Under the English common law, which accompanied the migra-
tion to North America, capital punishment was mandatory for all
defendants found guilty of murder.' Biblical sources prompted the
early colonists to add idolatry, witchcraft and stubbornness in a
child as subject to the penalty.5
Pennsylvania Quakers initiated the movement to abolish the
death penalty in America in the eighteenth century.6 The effort
resulted in the establishment of common law "degrees" of murder
in 1794 and the elimination of the death penalty for all crimes ex-
cept murder in the first degree, i.e., "willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing."'7 Other jurisdictions continued to execute per-
sons convicted of other felonies, such as burglary and rape.
Pennsylvania was apparently prepared to abolish the death pen-
alty altogether in 1917, according to the Harrisburg Evening Bulle-
tin.8 However, an ammunition plant near Chester, Pennsylvania
exploded under suspicious circumstances. The deaths caused by
the explosion and the possibility of sabotage prompted lawmakers
2. Hugo A. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 3 (Oxford University, 3d ed
1982).
3. This number does not include illegal lynchings which may have resulted in death
sentences had they gone to trial.
4. Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 177 (1976) (citation omitted). In 1791, when the
Eighth Amendment was adopted, the English "Bloody Code" still provided for death
sentences for more than two hundred offenses. Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 289
(1976).
5. Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punish-
ment 47 (Random House, 1973) (hereinafter "Cruel and Unusual").
6. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America at 4 (cited in note 2).
7. Id. For a time, William Penn had limited the crimes subject to capital punish-
ment in early Pennsylvania to murder and treason. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 47 n 4
(cited in note 5).
8. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 53 (cited in note 5).
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to keep the ultimate punishment.9
Between 1838 and 1846, Tennessee, Alabama and Louisiana au-
thorized the first discretionary death sentences for murder.10 In
1847, the Territory of Michigan abolished the death penalty for all
crimes except treason, becoming the first English-speaking juris-
diction in the world to do so.11 Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Maine
and Minnesota soon followed suit.12 However, it was only a general
trend away from widespread imposition of the death penalty, and
many of the states did not follow it (for example, New York exe-
cuted 682 people between 1900 and 1963). 1' As executions contin-
ued on a large scale in some states while other states were abolish-
ing the penalty, the conflicting opinions supporting and abhorring
capital punishment became intense.
The early case of Weems v United States14 provided an avenue
of appeal to the courts. Paul Weems was convicted by a Philippine
court of stealing 612 pesos by falsifying a cash book of the captain
of the port of Manilla. He was sentenced to fifteen years of "hard
and painful labor' '" in prison, chained at the ankle and wrist,
"perpetual absolute disqualification" of political rights16 and life-
long surveillance. The Supreme Court of the United States found
this to be "cruel in its excess of imprisonment" and "unusual in its
character.'
'17
In the post-World War II period, perhaps because the clause in
the Constitution is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obso-
lete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
9. Id.
10. Id at 10.
11. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty 13
(London, 1987).
12. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty at 13
(cited in note 11). In Minnesota, the death penalty was abolished after a hanging in St. Paul
where the rope was too long. A journalist graphically recounted the fourteen-and-a-half
minute strangulation under the headline: "Displayed His Nerve to the Very Last." Melt-
sner, Cruel and Unusual at 62 (cited in note 5).
13. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty at 10
(cited in note 11).
14. 217 US 349 (1910).
15. Weems, 217 US at 364.
16. Id.
17. Id at 377. The case also notes that earlier appeals from state sentences under the
Eighth Amendment were denied because it was felt at that time that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not apply to the states.
Weems is also interesting for Justice McKenna's overview of the history of the "Cruel and
Unusual" clause. Earlier law had permitted such punishments as whipping for wife beating
and banishment and slavery for free blacks convicted of larceny. Id at 378.
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ened by a humane justice,"18 the United States Supreme Court was
asked again to examine the constitutional limits of the death pen-
alty. This re-examination focused on the question of why certain
classes of defendants were often sentenced to capital punishment
while similarly situated defendants rarely received death
sentences. This led to a public and judicial perception of the pen-
alty's application as "arbitrary and capricious." '
As one example, consider that between 1908 and 1962, although
fifty-five percent of those imprisoned in Virginia for rape were
black, one-hundred percent of the men executed for rape2 0 during
that period were black.2 1 Other studies showed an increased likeli-
hood for "blue collar" offenders to receive capital sentences than
for "white collar" defendants.22 Many other egregious examples of
inequitable and capricious application are well-documented.2 3
Some grossly disproportionate examples of executions by race of
offenders are:
2 4
18. Id, citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 US 417, 427 (1884), and Mackin v United States,
117 US 348, 350 (1885).
19. Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) (plurality opinion). For example, out of 424
convicted murderers in Georgia eligible for the death penalty between July 1, 1964 and
December 31, 1968, fourteen were sentenced to death (three percent). Meltsner, Cruel and
Unusual at 183 (cited in note 5). In Maryland, although twenty-eight first degree murderers
were convicted between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1966, only four were given capital
sentences (fourteen percent). Id. And in Texas between 1946 and 1968, 5,034 persons were
convicted of murder and 139 (two percent) were sentenced to death. Id.
20. Execution for the rape of an adult woman was held unconstitutional as grossly
disproportionate to the crime in Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
This proportionality requirement was recently removed for all sentences other than the
death penalty. Harmelin v Michigan, US , 111 S Ct 2680 (1991). See also note 85 and
accompanying text.
21. Note, Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 Va L Rev 97, 114 (1972). Similarly,
since 1930, Georgia has executed fifty-eight blacks and three whites for rape. See Brief for
Petitioner at 1b, Jackson v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972).
22. William J. Bowers, Legal Homicide: Death as a Punishment in America, 1864-
1982 at 213-14 (Northeastern University Press, 1984).
23. See Marvin E. Wolfgang and Marc Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the
Death Penalty in 407 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
at 119-33 (1973). See also Lockett v Ohio, 348 US 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), a leading
case in which the defendant was sentenced to death despite the fact that she was the driver
of the getaway vehicle. Sandra Lockett had never entered the store during the robbery/
murder. Her co-defendant, the triggerman, received a life sentence after a plea bargain. The
case was remanded,
24. Cited in Amnesty International, United States of America passim (cited in note
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Blacks Whites
Alabama 1927-1962 205 33
Georgia 1924-1964 340 82
North Carolina 1901-1961 286 76
South Carolina 1912-1962 194 74
The execution of blacks for committing the same crimes as
whites, who were not executed, is one example of how the death
penalty was assigned arbitrarily and capriciously, in part evidenc-
ing jury motivations of passion and prejudice.15 The re-examina-
tion of criteria that states applied in capital sentencing cases led to
a large body of constitutional attacks focusing on the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.2 The ar-
gument was made that the death penalty is "cruel and unusual"
because of seemingly random application to similarly situated
criminals. Early precedent had established that the Eighth
Amendment must be construed and applied to reflect the evolving
moral standards of the country.28
The seminal modern case reflecting contemporary constitutional
boundaries is Furman v Georgia.29 The Court noted that unclear
standards in the law were allowing "arbitrary" and "capricious"
25. Furman, 408 US 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
26. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US Const, Amend VIII.
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment. California v Robinson, 370 US 660 (1962). For an early example of an attack
on the death penalty based on the Eighth Amendment, see Louisiana v Resweber, 329 US
459, 466 (1947) (Frankfurter concurring). Willie Francis received a tremendous jolt of elec-
tricity in Louisiana's electric chair but survived it. Four justices found a second attempt to
execute to be constitutional since the botched attempt was merely an accident and not an
attempt by the state to inflict unnecessary pain. Resweber, 329 US at 463-64. Four other
justices found this to be a lack of civilized conduct intended to be prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. Id at 479. Frankfurter's opinion concluded it would be an imposition of his
personal views on what was uncivilized on the people of Louisiana.
27. The Legal Defense Fund, in briefs submitted as amicus curie in Boykin v Ala-
bama, 395 US 238 (1969), argued that, as applied to robbery, the death penalty was applied
as randomly as a roll of the dice. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 182 (cited in note 5).
Since over 200,000 robberies were known to the police in 1967, it was argued that the few
selected for capital punishment were "freakishly" selected. Id.
28. See, for example, Weems, 217 US at 378; Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 100 (1958)
(plurality opinion) (the Eighth Amendment's purpose is to assure that punishment is "exer-
cised within the limits of civilized standards"); Gregg v Georgia 428 US 153 (1976); and
Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280 (1976). This allows for a flexibility in interpretation
allowing conformity to contemporary standards as measured by the Court.
29. 408 US 238 (1972). Furman was convicted of murder under a Georgia statute
which did not require specific jury determinations about either the circumstances or the
character of the defendant.
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sentences to be imposed by juries and declared that legislative
guidance must be provided to prevent "wantonly" or "freakishly"
imposed death penalties.30 Justice Douglas wrote that "it would
seem incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defend-
ant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his
race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed
under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices"
and therefore cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.31 The
Furman Court further stated that the class of death-eligible de-
fendants must be narrowed to bridle jury discretion. This decision
effectively invalidated all of the existing death penalty statutes of
the various states and commuted the sentences of those sentenced
under the invalid statutes.3 2 It also spawned a plethora of litigation
as the Court has subsequently struggled to define the extent of leg-
islative guidance required and the extent of legislative guidance
permitted by the Constitution to bridle jury discretion.
The first major group of cases to reach the United States Su-
preme Court following revision of the states' death penalties in-
cluded Gregg v Georgia.33 Gregg upheld the imposition of a death
sentence under a Georgia statute, which had been revised after
Furman, for a murder which occurred during an armed robbery
3 4
The statute provided that mitigating circumstances be considered
on automatic appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court and directed
30. Furman, 408 US at 310 (Stewart concurring). "There is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not." Id at 313 (White concurring).
31. Id at 242-43 (Douglas concurring), citing the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from
which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken.
32. Retroactivity on collateral review is no longer a part of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989). See also Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989)
(remand with instructions that the trial court admit evidence of defendant's mental retarda-
tion was not a retroactive rule). Non-retroactivity is peculiar in this context, since it seems
to run counter to the expressed deference to evolving moral standards.
33. 428 US 153 (1976). Gregg was convicted of two counts of robbery and two counts
of murder.
34. The Gregg Court determined that the death penalty is not per se cruel and un-
usual. Gregg, 428 US at 187 (the original intent of the clause was primarily to prohibit
tortures and other "barbarous" punishments). See also Anthony Granucci, Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Cal L Rev 839, 855-56 (1969).
When the Eighth Amendment was adopted, it was accepted practice in America to punish
by public whipping, notching the ear of an offender, or even placing a brand on the cheek to
facilitate future recognition. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 171 (cited in note 5). Profitt v
Florida, 428 US 242 (1976), decided the same day, held constitutional a system which di-
rected the judge and advisory jury to consider certain enumerated mitigating circumstances.
An advisory jury acts as an ordinary jury, but the court is only guided by and not bound by
the jury's determination.
1992
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that, if the sentence was affirmed, the Georgia court must include
in its decision reference to similar cases it had considered.85 The
United States Supreme Court determined that this statute satis-
fied the standard that the "penalty must accord with the dignity of
man which is a basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment.""6 Gregg thus settled the question unanswered by Furman:
had the death penalty become per se cruel and unusual under the
evolving moral standards which set the limits of the Eighth
Amendment? From Gregg until the present, the answer has been,
"no. 81 7
Greggs was decided the same day as Woodson v North Caro-
lina.3 9 Woodson struck down as unconstitutional a statute impos-
ing mandatory death penalties for all first degree murders.40 The
35. Gregg, 428 US at 204-05. The Georgia statute provided:
(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, ei-
ther express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Express malice is
that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is
manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where
no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart ....
Ga Code Ann § 26-1101 (Michie, 1972).
The sentencing statute specified aggravating circumstances for which the death penalty
may be imposed for the crimes of treason, aircraft hijacking, murder, rape, armed robbery
and kidnapping. The statute required the judge to "include in his instructions to the jury
for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise au-
thorized by law and any of the [ten] statutory aggravating circumstances which may be
supported by the evidence." Ga Code Ann § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp 1975).
36. Gregg, 428 US at 173, citing Trop v Dulles, 356 US 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
37. "Although this issue [whether the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual] was
presented and addressed in Furman, it was not resolved by the Court." Gregg, 428 US at
169.
38. Gregg was decided as an Eighth Amendment case, but it apparently applied a
due process analysis. "There is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 US at 313 (White con-
curring). "For, of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as
these .... Id at 309-10 (Stewart concurring). Also, "the decisive grievance of the opinions
. .. is that the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to
produce even-handed justice." Id at 398-99 (Burger dissenting).
39. 428 US 280 (1976). Woodson and three others killed a convenience store clerk
and seriously wounded a customer in the course of a robbery. The mandatory statute under
which they were sentenced read:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. -A murder which shall
be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or
by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, bur-
glary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be
punished with death. ...
NC Gen Stat § 14-17 (Cum Supp 1975).
40. Woodson discussed a history of cases criticizing automatic death sentences dating
944
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Court reasoned that the "two crucial indicators of evolving stan-
dards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our
society-jury determinations and legislative enact-
ments-conclusively point to the repudiation of automatic death
sentence.'41 In sum, the Constitution after Woodson requires "in-
dividualized" sentencing, not automatic penalties which do not
consider the particular person and circumstances of the offense.42
The mandatory death penalty in Woodson "was held invalid be-
cause it permitted no consideration of relevant facets of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of
the particular offense."4 s The Court extended this requirement in
Lockett v Ohio 4 to mandate that a sentencer must be allowed to
consider "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's char-
acter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
'45
from Winston v United States, 172 US 303 (1899). Woodson, 428 US at 296-97. For other
instances where the Court found automatic imposition of the death penalty unconstitu-
tional, see Roberts v Louisiana, 428 US 325, 333-34 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and
Stevens) (automatic death sentence for intentional killing in the course of certain enumer-
ated felonies); Sumner v Shuman 483 US 66, 85 (1987) (automatic death penalty for pris-
oner who commits murder while serving a life sentence); Roberts v Louisiana, 431 US 633,
637 (1977) (automatic death sentence for the murder of a police officer).
41. Woodson, 428 US at 280.
42. Id, citing Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 247 (1949).
43. Lockett v Ohio, 439 US 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
See also McKoy v North Carolina, 494 US 433 (1990), which vacated a sentence imposed
where the jury was required to find mitigating circumstances unanimously, and Mills v Ma-
ryland, 486 US 367 (1988), which held a death penalty statute unconstitutional where there
was an unproven possibility that the jury may have felt it could not give consideration to all
mitigating circumstances. There was no showing in Mills that the jury actually misperceived
its ability to consider mitigating circumstances, but there was a "substantial risk." Mills,
486 US at 381.
44. 348 US 586 (1978).
45. Lockett, 348 at 604 (emphasis and footnote omitted). See also Eddings v
Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 117 n 13 (1982) (O'Connor concurring). Monty Lee Eddings was a
sixteen-year-old runaway who was travelling in a car owned by his brother when the car was
pulled over by a police officer. Eddings killed the officer with a shotgun. The trial court
considered the aggravating circumstances offered by the prosecution but refused to recog-
nize any of the evidence offered in mitigation. In reversing, Justice Powell wrote, "Failure to
consider all the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in
plain violation of Lockett . . . ." Eddings was sixteen years old, Eddings, 455 US at 104,
emotionally disturbed, id at 107, beaten by a "harsh father," id, and had an unhappy up-
bringing in a turbulent family, id. State courts refused to allow the jury to consider any of
these factors as mitigating, but the United States Supreme Court remanded, holding that
Eddings must be permitted to introduce the evidence and the jury must be allowed to weigh
it. Id at 117.
This requirement that all mitigating evidence be permitted to be given effect at the sen-
tencing stage was recently balanced by the prosecution's ability to introduce evidence of the
Duquesne Law Review
This dichotomy of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
not so rigid that it precludes other schemes designed to achieve
similar effect. In Jurek v Texas,4 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a statute which prescribed consideration of five ag-
gravating circumstances and, as interpreted by the Texas courts,
allowed consideration of mitigating circumstances by focusing on
the particularized circumstances of the individual offender.47
Dictum in Jurek stated that although the consideration of only
aggravating circumstances would "almost certainly fall short of
providing the individual sentencing determination.., required by
the Eighth and Fifth Amendments [by approaching] mandatory
laws," the Texas statute survived scrutiny.4" The distinction which
saved the Jurek statute was that, as applied, the Constitution was
satisfied because the statute permitted consideration of "all rele-
vant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed,
but also why it should not be imposed.
49
These cases elaborately elucidated the "evolving moral stan-
dard" prescribed by Weems. The purpose of the constitutional
limits has been stated as the requirement that a state "genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.
'50
Although death penalty review cases have been decided in the
face of vehement dissent, the two minimal standards seemed well
established: the Constitution requires limiting jury discretion by
narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants in a rational man-
ner (to provide an individualized sentence), and a sentencer must
be allowed to consider and give effect to all mitigating factors
"impact" of a murder on the surviving family members. Payne v Tennessee, US , 111 S
Ct 2597 (1991).
46. 428 US 262 (1976).
47. Jurek, 428 US at 272-73. This statute requires a sentencer to assess the
probability that the defendant will constitute a "continuing threat to society." Id at 272.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted this to allow the defendant to present
mitigating circumstances. Id.
48. Id at 271.
49. Id.
50. Zant v Stephens, 462 US 862, 877 (1983). The Court stated, "Statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative defini-
tion: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant, 462 US at
878.
Zant, however, upheld a conviction pursuant to a Georgia statute under which "the find-
ing of an aggravating circumstance [did] not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in
the exercise of it discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons con-
victed of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." Id at 874.
Vol. 30:937
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before imposing the death penalty. 1
Narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants as required by
the Constitution has, since Gregg, been accomplished by the use of
"aggravating circumstances. ' 52 The determination of what consti-
tutes aggravating circumstances has been left to the discretion of
the state legislatures."3
A tension then exists between a state's legislative prerogative
and its strong interest in a capital sentencing proceeding in having
the jury "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death."5 " Although the legislature must define
who is eligible for imposition of the death penalty, it is the jury
which must have the ultimate responsibility for sentencing.55
The subtle interplay necessitates a balancing of powers not only
between the legislative and judicial branches, but also between the
state and federal governments. If the states determine that the ef-
fectiveness of their police powers requires that certain classes of
murderers be subject to the death penalty, to what extent may the
federal Constitution limit the states' implementation?
The United States Supreme Court, under its constitutional pre-
rogative," has asserted control. Among the recent cases which
51. McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987).
52. Zant, 462 US at 877. See also Godfrey v Georgia, 446 US 420 (1980). "Aggravat-
ing factors" found at the sentencing stage can be used to distinguish the murder from all
other murders, thus narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants. Godfrey, 446 US at
428-29.
53. See Lowenfield v Phelps, 484 US 231, 244 (1988), and Jurek, 428 US at 270.
Lowenfield was convicted under a Louisiana statute wherein an aggravating circumstance
was defined in the same manner as an element of the crime. First degree murder occurred
where "the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more
than one person." La Rev Stat Ann § 14:30.A.(3) (West 1986). The sole aggravating circum-
stance found was that "the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily injury
to more than one person." La Crim Proc Code Ann art 905.4(d) (West 1984). Lowenfield was
convicted of two counts of manslaughter and three counts of first degree murder after he
killed a woman with whom he had lived, three members of her family, and one of her male
friends.
54. Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510, 519 (1968). Witherspoon concerned the pro-
priety of excluding persons from the jury who admitted to having "conscientious or religious
scruples" against the infliction of the death penalty. Witherspoon, 391 US at 522. It was
concluded that the jury was therefore not impartial, so that the sentencing scheme violated
the Due Process Clause. Id at 523. This is the so-called "death qualified" jury. Id at 517.
55. Lowenfield, 484 US at 246. There are two alternative ways in which the legisla-
ture may perform the narrowing function: "The legislature may itself narrow the definition
of capital offenses . . . so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the
legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury find-
ings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase." Id at 231.
56. The Court established itself as the final interpreter of the Constitution in Mar-
bury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803). The Court's power over state legislatures flows from Arti-
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show a marked shift in the Court's attitude towards the death pen-
alty, one of the most remarkable comes out of Pennsylvania. 7
BLYSTONE V PENNSYLvANA: THE BURDEN SHIFTS
Scott Wayne Blystone drove his girlfriend and another couple
down a Pennsylvania road in September, 1983. A Pennsylvania
jury later determined that this road was the road to the electric
chair for Blystone.
On the evening of the crime, Blystone's vehicle was low on gas
and the occupants were low on resources. A hitchhiker, Carlton
Charles Smithburger, Jr., was immediately targeted by Blystone
for a robbery to which his friends acquiesced. Blystone picked up
Smithburger, a man who was characterized at trial as having a
learning disability, and asked him if he had any money to contrib-
ute for gas. Smithburger replied that he had only a few dollars and
was searching his pockets when Blystone produced a revolver and
held it against Smithburger's head.
Blystone then ordered Smithburger to close his eyes and put his
hands on the dashboard while he pulled the car off the road. Blys-
tone told his victim to get out of the car and into a field where he
searched Smithburger at gunpoint. Smithburger's pockets on that
Friday night yielded just thirteen dollars. He was ordered to lie
face down in the field, where he lay shaking. Blystone went back to
the car to tell his companions he intended to kill Smithburger.
Returning to his victim, Blystone knelt on Smithburger's back
and held the gun to his head. He asked for a description of the car.
Unfortunately, Smithburger accurately described the distinctive
green car with the wrecked back end. Blystone said, "Goodbye,"
and shot six bullets into the back of Smithburger's head.
A subsequent conversation, recorded in grisly detail by use of a
concealed wire worn by an acquaintance of Blystone during lunch
at a Burger King, left the jury with no reasonable doubt as to Blys-
tone's guilt.5 8 During the conversation, Blystone recounted re-
cle VI, Section 2 of the Constitution (the Supremacy Clause).
57. Blystone v Pennsylvania, 494 US 299 (1990). Many of the facts of Blystone re-
counted here are taken from the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Common-
wealth v Blystone, 519 Pa 450, 549 A2d 81 (1988).
Subsequent to Blystone's sentencing, Pennsylvania has replaced its electric chair with
death by lethal injection. 61 PS § 2121.1, Pub L 572, Nov 29, 1990.
58. Blystone, 549 A2d at 84. The tape as transcribed at trial is appended to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion, although that court stated the testimonial evidence of




turning to the scene of the murder to retrieve a pack of the vic-
tim's cigarettes, which had Blystone's fingerprints on them (he
smoked the bloodstained cigarettes).5 9 This mission to retrieve the
cigarette pack, which he felt contained betraying fingerprints, in-
cluded a surreal playacting scene performed by Blystone and an
accomplice for the benefit of non-existent police who might be hid-
ing in the bushes. This bizarre scene culminated in the discovery of
the cigarettes under the mutilated body of Smithburger, which was
described in nonchalant detail over lunch by the murderer.
The wiretap captured Blystone asserting that "getting away with
[murder is] very easy" and that murder is "a real f- g experi-
ence. It's wild." He believed he was wearing the same jeans at
lunch that day that he had worn on the murderous night. Blystone
recounted how his girlfriend laughingly picked a piece of the vic-
tim's brain from his face, played with it, and threw it in the ash-
tray of the car. He confided, "It don't make you feel bad.. .. We
laugh about it."
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
mandatory aspects of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute.6
59. Id at 97. Justice Stevens, at oral argument, uncharacteristically breached judicial
decorum to comment that Blystone is "not a very nice man."
60. Blystone, 494 US 299 (1990). The Pennsylvania statute reads in pertinent part:
"The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggra-
vating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance." 42 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 9711(c)(iv) (Purdon 1988) (emphasis added).
The aggravating circumstances are enumerated as:
(1) The victim was a fireman, peace officer, or other public servant concerned in offi-
cial detention. . . , who was killed in the performance of his duties.
(2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be
paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the
killing of the victim.
(3) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or was held as
a shield or hostage.
(4) The death of the victim occurred while the defendant was engaged in the hi-
jacking of an aircraft.
(5) The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by
the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the
defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
(6) The defendant committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(10) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense committed
either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life impris-
onment or death was impossible or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life
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From a purely human perspective, the extreme callousness, vulgar-
ity and "feeling of power" Blystone manifested in this taped con-
versation made his case a most unsympathetic one for a constitu-
tional challenge. Viewed from a perspective of pure legal analysis,
however, the Blystone case was the perfect test for determining the
legislature's ability to define capital crimes.
Blystone's sole legal aggravating circumstance was the thirteen
dollar robbery. For whatever reason, he refused to offer a single
mitigating circumstance. 6 1 Pennsylvania law provides for auto-
matic, direct appeal to the state's supreme court in cases imposing
the death penalty. Blystone argued to the state's highest court that
the death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it man-
dated a sentence of death based on the outcome of the weighing
process of aggravating versus mitigating circumstances. The same
jury which found the aggravating circumstance, it was argued, was
therefore foreclosed in the bifurcated sentencing stage from impos-
ing any sentence other than death.6 2 Since the jury had found
Blystone guilty of robbery, an aggravating circumstance, and since
there were no mitigating circumstances, the statutory language
mandated that, when aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigat-
ing circumstances, "the verdict must be a sentence of death.
'6 3
imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
(11) The defendant has been convicted of another murder, committed either before
or at the time of the offense at issue.
(12)The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter.. . committed ei-
ther before or at the time of the offense at issue.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(d) (Purdon 1988).
Further aggravating circumstances have been added after Blystone.
61. Blystone, 494 US at 302. Pursuant to the statute, the jury was instructed that it
was free to find any mitigating circumstances even though, contrary to warnings from the
trial judge and advice from defendant's counsel, none were offered. While aggravating cir-
cumstances must be found unanimously by the jury in the weighing process to vote life or
death, individual jury members may consider mitigating circumstances not considered miti-
gating by the other jurors. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(e) (Purdon 1988). The jury found no
mitigating circumstances from the evidence. Blystone, 494 US at 302. This catch-all provi-
sion of the statute apparently is necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Limiting the
introduction of mitigating circumstances has provided grounds for reversal in several in-
stances. See, for example, Woodson, 428 US 280 (1976); Skipper v South Carolina, 476 US 1
(1986) (the trial court had excluded as irrelevant evidence that the defendant had adjusted
well to prison life); and Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982) (jury must be allowed to
consider defendant's mental retardation).
62. Blystone, 549 A2d at 92. A separate sentencing hearing is required by the statute
for those convicted of first degree murder. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(a) (1988). This
comports with the language of Gregg, 428 US at 191-92, which stated that a bifurcated
process is "more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in
Furman."
63. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(c)(iv). The text of the statute is set forth in note 60.
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Based on precedent, both at the state level6 4 and the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court summarily rejected Blystone's argument. Certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court. Writing for the ma-
jority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the statute satisfied the
requirement that all types of mitigating circumstances may, at the
jury's discretion, be considered. Of more reaching significance was
the Court's holding that the statute is not impermissibly
mandatory. That is, the Court found that death is imposed only
"after a determination that the aggravating circumstances out-
weigh the mitigating circumstances ... or that there are no such
mitigating circumstances."66 It is this second holding which is
likely to have far collateral consequences.
The majority opinion summarized the current state of constitu-
tional jurisprudence applicable to the death penalty as consisting
of a twofold analysis: first, a threshold requirement must consist of
legislatively enumerated "rational criteria which narrow the deci-
sionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a partic-
ular defendant's case meet that threshold. '67 This threshold is fur-
ther controlled by a "societal consensus" that if a penalty is
disproportionate to a particular offense, the state is prevented
from imposing the death penalty for that offense. 8 Second, the
64. Commonwealth v Peterkin, 511 Pa 299, 513 A2d 373 (1986). Peterkin was sen-
tenced to death for the shooting of two persons during a service station robbery. Peterkin's
challenge to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute was that the mandatory lan-
guage precluded a sentencing authority from granting mercy or leniency. The state supreme
court held that the ability to introduce a broad range of mitigating evidence satisfied consti-
tutional requirements. Peterkin, 513 A2d at 387-88.
65. Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972). Furman held that jury discretion must be
channeled to avoid arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing. See also Lockett v Ohio, 438
US 586 (1978). Lockett mandated that a capital sentencing jury be allowed to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence.
66. Blystone, 494 US at 305. The opinion cited as authority for this standard Lock-
ett, 438 US 586 (1978), and Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989). Penry was a victim of
child abuse who had organic brain disease and retardation giving him the mental age of a
six-and-a-half year old. Penry was found guilty of capital murder in Texas. Jury instructions
limited the mitigating circumstances which could be considered to effectively exclude these
factors. The United States Supreme Court remanded because the same statute found consti-
tutional in Jurek was now being applied in an unconstitutional manner. All relevant evi-
dence which mitigates against imposing the death penalty must be allowed to go to the jury.
Penry, 492 US at 328, citing Eddings and Lockett.
67. Blystone, 494 US at 308-09, citing McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987).
68. Blystone, 494 US at 308-09. The derivation of this consensus was elucidated in
Gregg, 428 US at 179-81 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens). The Court evaluated
several factors. The enactments of legislative bodies are considered to be of primary impor-
tance. The Gregg Court also cited California and Massachusetts referenda authorizing capi-
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state cannot channel the sentencer's discretion in a way which pre-
vents the consideration of any relevant information offered by the
defendant8 9
Blystone's jury, having made requests for clarification from the
court of what constitutes a mitigating circumstance (after just
thirty minutes of deliberation), 0 found none in the record on its
own. 71 The jury may have rejected the possibly mitigating infer-
ence that the offering of no mitigating circumstances indicated a
newfound remorse, or it may have rejected that conclusion due to
the recorded "confession. 7 2  At that point, because of the
mandatory language of the statute, the jury was helpless to save
the life of Blystone.7 ' The United States Supreme Court found
that Pennsylvania's statute fell within the "permissible" range of
discretion.
74
PAYNE, PAIN, AND PAYING
Another very recent case produced an even more radical shift in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Payne v Tennessee,7 the de-
fendant had been refused sex in the apartment of a twenty-nine
year old woman. He removed a butcher knife from a kitchen
tal punishment. Id at 181. It was further stated that the "jury is also a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved." Id.
It should be noted that different states' legislatures may reach their own determination of
a societal consensus by virtue of an institutional advantage over the Court in fact finding.
69. Blystone, 494 US at 309.
70. Brief for Appellant at 16. Blystone, 494 US at 312 n 3 (Brennan dissenting).
71. Blystone, 494 US at 311 n 2 (Brennan dissenting).
72. The trial judge emphasized in his instructions to the jury that the defendant
must prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id at 312 n 3
(Brennan dissenting). This is a correct reading of 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(e)(1)(iii)
(Purdon 1988).
73. One fundamental flaw that seems apparent to this author is the simple dichotomy
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are specifically
enumerated and carry with them the weight of legislative enactment. The jury's own discre-
tion, factored by their self-doubt stemming from unfamiliarity with the system, will deter-
mine the mitigating factors. It is analogous to a civil jury weighing negligence per se and
contributory negligence.
74. Dissenting were Justices Brennan and Marshall, joined in part by Justices Ste-
vens and Blackmun. The dissenters reasoned that the mandatory aspects of the statute give
control of the ultimate decision over whether the death penalty is appropriate to the legisla-
ture when the decision is properly within the domain of the jury. The judge instructed the
jury that once it found an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, "It is
your duty to return a verdict of death." This, the dissent stated, was the first time the Court
allowed such legislation to survive constitutional scrutiny. Blystone, 494 US at 324 (Bren-
nan dissenting).
75. 111 S Ct 2597 (1991).
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drawer and stabbed the woman, her three-year-old son and her
two-year-old daughter. Although stabbed completely through the
body, the boy miraculously survived. His mother and sister were
killed.
The prosecutor introduced testimony by the boy's grandmother
that he asked about his mother's whereabouts on a daily basis. The
boy often said he missed his (baby sister) Lacy. The prosecutor
told the jury that there was no one to look out for Lacy. She would
never go to the prom or play with her brother. The boy would
never again be kissed by his mother and tucked into bed and sung
a lullaby. The prosecutor even conjured the image of the brave,
wounded little boy holding his intestines in with his hand while
being taken to an ambulance.
After this, the "death qualified"7 jury of course sentenced
Payne to die for the crime. The United States Supreme Court, re-
versing two established precedents" by calling them "wrongly de-
cided," upheld the constitutionality of introducing "victim impact"
evidence. It reasoned that a fair trial where any defendant can in-
troduce any mitigating evidence produces an unequal burden on
the prosecution and so requires a balancing. This balancing is ac-
complished, after Payne, by permitting the jury to consider the
impact of the crime on survivors when weighing "blameworthi-
ness" of the murderer.7 8 While a majority of people may support
76. "Death qualified" juries are described above in note 54. See also, for example,
Sumner v Shuman, 483 US 66 (1987), and Gregg, 428 US at 189-95.
77. Booth v Maryland, 482 US 496 (1987); South Carolina v Gathers, 490 US 805
(1989). In Booth, the statute required the presentment of a victim impact statement (here-
inafter "VIS") in all felony cases. This VIS was required to include, among other things, any
"information related.to the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's family that
the trial court requires." Md Ann Code art 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986). Booth, apparently to
steal money to buy heroin, robbed an elderly couple who were his neighbors. He stabbed
them to death to prevent them from identifying him. Booth, 482 US at 497-98.
In Gathers, the defendant and three others assaulted a man sitting on a park bench. The
victim was severely beaten, struck over the head with a bottle, and pummeled with an um-
brella which was then inserted into his anus. Sometime later, Gathers returned to stab the
victim with a knife. The victim considered himself a preacher and referred to himself as
"Reverend Minister." The prosecutor introduced the contents of religious tracts the victim
had been carrying on that night and the jury sentenced Gathers to death. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed based on the fact that the knowledge that the victim was a
religious man suggested that Gathers deserved to die. While the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the scattering of these papers was relevant to the crime, the content
of the religious tracts, it ruled, was not relevant. Gathers, 490 US at 811. Justice White
concurred, simply stating, "Unless Booth. . . is to be overruled, the judgment below must
be affirmed." Id at 812.
78. A murderer will apparently be much more likely to receive the death penalty if
his victim is established in the community as opposed to, say, a homeless person or an
1992
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the introduction of victim impact statements at this time,"e it is a
marked shift from the predisposition to mercy historically embod-
ied in our system."0
Another example of the Supreme Court's eroding protections of
the individual is seen in the newfound ability to execute the men-
tally retarded.8 1 The United States Supreme Court has found that
there is no constitutional barrier to imposing the death sentence
on the mentally retarded in the recent case of Penry v Lynaugh.82
Those who were considered incompetent had a defense even
under the common law. Sir Edward Coke wrote, "By intendment
of Law the execution of the offender is for example. . . but so it is
not when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spec-
tacle, both against law and of extream inhumanity and cruelty, and
can be no example to others.""3 The Americans followed this rule.
Blackstone wrote, "If a man of sound memory commits a capital
offense, and before arraignment for it becomes mad, he ought not
elderly person whose friends have largely preceded him. Thus while it may be true that no
man is an island, some are connected to mankind by more tenuous ground than the rest.
Therefore, a logical killer who bases his actions to some degree on potential punishment will
kill the unloved (or less loved) whose life is now somehow intrinsically less valuable to soci-
ety regardless of other contributions.
79. Recall the particular relish of the crowd gathered at the Florida execution site of
mass murderer Ted Bundy. People pretending to roast marshmallows and holding signs
reading, "Too bad Ted, you're dead," displayed a mindless sort of mob vengeance. Compare,
Gregg, 428 US at 173 ("Public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal
sanctions are not conclusive").
80. In a federal case where there was the mere possibility that the jury could misin-
terpret the law, a previous Court stated, "In death cases, doubts such as those presented
here should be resolved in favor of the accused." Andres v United States, 333 US 740, 752
(1948). See also Mills v Maryland, 486 US 367 (1988) (possibility that the jury would misin-
terpret their ability to consider all relevant mitigating evidence required remand).
Mr. Justice Marshall did not go gentle into that goodnight. His dissent from Payne
stated, "Enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment frequently re-
quires this Court to rein in the forces of democratic politics, this Court can legitimately lay
claim to compliance with its directives only if the public understands the Court to be imple-
menting 'principles. . . founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.'"
Payne, 111 S Ct at 2623-24 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall further raged that the
Court's "campaign to resurrect yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander the authority
and legitimacy of this Court. . . ." Id at 2625.
81. See, for example, Ford v Wainwright, 477 US 399 (1986) (Eighth Amendment
prohibits state from inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane); Eddings v
Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1981) (jury must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence of
mental retardation and organic brain disease). See also Note, Insanity of the Condemned,
88 Yale L J 533 (1979).
82. 492 US 302 (1989).
83. Edward Coke, 3 Institutes 6 (6th ed 1680). Refusing to execute the incompetent
in some ways vindicates all criminal law because those who are punished are acknowledged
to be responsible for their acts.
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to be arraigned for it." 84 Our "contemporary standards" will no
longer protect the incompetent when members of society cry out
for vengeance.
In another example, the Supreme Court has also turned from the
path of precedent in holding that the "eighth amendment contains
no proportionality guarantee"85 between the crime and the sen-
tence imposed. In Harmelin v Michigan," the Court allowed a
Michigan judgment to stand which sentenced a Ronald Harmelin
to life in prison with no possibility of parole. The defendant was a
first-time offender and was convicted of possession with intent to
deliver cocaine. Recall that as early as 1910 the Court in Weems
had held the opposite (i.e., that disproportionate sentences were
both cruel and unusual).
Following the Weems precedent, the Gregg Court explicitly
stated that "public perceptions of standards of decency are not
conclusive . . . .This means, at least, that the punishment not be
'excessive'. '87 Excessive punishments were also condemned in
Furman. That Court, looking to ancient sources, stated: "Excessive
amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the
Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation." ' The Barons of
Runneymeade echo a far cry from the Justices of Harmelin."9 The
protections enjoyed since 1215 became a memory in 1991 as the
United States Supreme Court bowed to public pressure against
crime in general and drug crime in particular.90
84. William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 24-25 (1783).
85. Harmelin v Michigan, US , 111 S Ct 2680 (1991).
86. 111 S Ct 2680 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality (himself and Chief
Justice Rhenquist) and concluded after a long examination of history that there is no pro-
portionality review except with respect to death sentences, because the protection against
"cruel and unusual" punishments was originally intended to limit judges and not the legisla-
ture. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2691. Justice Kennedy (concurring with Justices O'Connor and
Souter) found a narrow proportionality review which is not confined to death penalty cases.
Id at 2702-03 (Kennedy concurring) (relying on stare decisis of the last eighty years).
87. Gregg, 428 US at 173. The Court stated that, as applied to abstract punishments
(such as the death penalty) as opposed to particular punishments (as applied to a specific
defendant for a specific crime), "excessive" punishment analysis has two aspects. First, not
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and second, the punishment must not be grossly
disproportionate to the crime. Id (citations omitted).
88. Furman, 408 US at 243.
89. More recently, the Supreme Court held a life sentence without possibility of pa-
role for the crime of recidivism based on seven underlying nonviolent felonies to be a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. Solem v Helm, 463 US 277 (1983).
90. Peculiarly, on his way to finding no original intent to require proportionality of
sentencing, Justice Scalia quoted Patrick Henry urging the adoption of a bill of rights in
Virginia: "What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of tortures,
or cruel and barbarous punishment." Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2694.
1992
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It is possible that those members of the Court who narrowly ad-
here to precedent and find proportionality review mandated by the
Eighth Amendment will have to reexamine their views, given the
lack of textual distinction between capital punishments and other
punishments. Ronald Harmelin was, after all, sentenced to death
in prison for his drug possession.
JUDICIAL EROSION OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS-Is THERE A
LIMIT?
Individualized sentencing has, prior to Blystone, required the
consideration of the weight of both the aggravating and the miti-
gating circumstances when choosing whether to impose a death
sentence. 1 The weight of an aggravating circumstance is equally as
relevant to the propriety of the death penalty as the weight of any
mitigating circumstance when making the required "reasoned
moral response.
' '9 2
Enumeration in a statute of aggravating circumstances precludes
any moral judgment about the particular act or the actor.9 s In this
respect, the jury is precluded from fulfilling its proper function of
determining whether it believes the defendant's particular offense
warrants the death penalty. When statutes enumerate aggravating
circumstances, the presumption, if it may so be called, rests in
favor of death.94 The complete rejection of other principles, for ex-
91. Blystone, 494 US 323-24 (Brennan dissenting).
92. Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989); California v Brown, 479 US 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor concurring). Note that Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Blystone.
93. Examples might include the moral differences that might exist in a particular
case between robbery and rape or between the triggerman and an accomplice.
94. In many ways, this approach threatens to return us to the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" results experienced prior to Furman. When a legislature acts in the abstract, far re-
moved in time and place from a trial, it imposes its will somewhat blindly. At least when the
results of a jury were arbitrary and capricious in light of the facts of particular cases, it was
because the jury was blinded by emotions, even ugly ones. Lowenfield v Phelps, 484 US 231
(1988), held that the sole aggravating circumstance may consist of an element of the offense
of capital murder. In Commonwealth v Holcomb, 508 Pa 425, 498 A2d 833 (1985), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court interpreted 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(d)(6) (Purdon 1988) to
allow capital sentencing even where the underlying felony is nonviolent. Such a sentence
will be mandatory after Blystone, presumably for such "aggravating" crimes as battery, sto-
len vehicles, or even certain conspiracies. This leaves the discretion of Pennsylvania's able
prosecutors and the willingness of presumably rational defendants to offer mitigation as the
main barriers to abuse. The potential for lawlessness by juries, in failing to convict guilty
defendants for fear of mandatory death sentences where they were unwarranted, was a




ample the non-execution of the mentally retarded,95 introduction
of inflammatory victim impact statements containing information
the perpetrator could not have known at the time of the crime,96
and the rejection of the ancient proportionality requirement,
97
clearly show that the United States Supreme Court now considers
themselves free to implement the harshest penalties the population
will support.
There is some evidence supporting the argument that the Court
has always been supportive of a state's rights to execute murderers
whenever doing so was in a non-discriminatory manner. For exam-
ple, more modern methods of execution have been accepted in
Wilkerson v Utah98 (public shooting) and In re Kemmler99 (elec-
trocution). These are no less horrible than hanging. 100 Lethal gas
chambers have withstood attack despite the trend in the states to-
wards lethal injections.10' But now the Eighth Amendment seems
destined to become little more than an outline for prison facility
maintenance. A constitutional system which allows private rights
to be taken away by an unelected branch of government is a preca-
rious one.
The expansion of individualized liberties under constitutional
doctrines, which necessarily involves trade-offs against the rights
of society collectively, may not be welcomed in all circles; but such
expansion hardly threatens the republic. When the Court is al-
lowed to diminish the rights already established or vested in the
people by their Constitution, the only limits on the erosion are the
temperaments of the justices. The proper method of removing in-
dividual constitutional protection, for the protection of society in
general should be by constitutional amendment. If the Justices will
95. Penry, 492 US 302 (1989).
96. Payne, 111 S Ct 2597 (1991).
97. Harmelin, 111 S Ct 2680 (1991).
98. 99 US 130 (1878).
99. 136 US 436 (1890).
100. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide bet-
ter standards for death penalty review. For example, Justice Frankfurter believed the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states, yet he believed the Fourteenth Amendment
itself "expresses a demand for civilized standards." Nevertheless, he felt that "the risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty
. . . is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Andres v United States, 333 US 740, 752 (1948).
Note that Andres was a review of a federal death penalty statute. Any reference to the
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment are therefore either dicta, or incorporated tacitly
as requirements of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and then applicable against
the federal government.
101. Gray v Lucas, 463 US 1237 (1983).
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not impose such a limit upon themselves, as by a rule of Court
requiring super majority, we may soon find it incumbent upon our-
selves to impose on them.
When the Court employs the fiction that the legislature has ex-
pressed the will of the people by looking to the statutes to deter-
mine contemporary moral standards, 102 it cannot do so as well as
the legislature. The Court has neither the expertise nor the re-
sources to make such an assessment accurately. The justices need
not even stand for re-election. Furthermore, attempts by the Court
to discern popular opinion constitute circular reasoning: the Con-
stitution is interpreted by the Court to protect, among other
things, individual rights from majority despotism; the majority
elects the representatives who pass laws; those laws are then used
by the Court to define constitutional limits.
Although the majority's exercise of its will moves by "fits and
starts" and may take decades to come to fruition because the
Court looks to majority standards, it is inevitable that those stan-
dards will ultimately prevail. The Constitution is only a friction on
majority will-it cannot protect the individual.
CONCLUSION
There are some who believe, as did John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes, 10 3 that laws are meant to protect us from others. This is
apparently the view of the current majority on the Court. Others,
including David Hume10 4 and some members of the Constitutional
Convention, believe that laws are also meant to protect us from
ourselves. The twentieth century has provided us with some pow-
erful examples that this is by no means an outdated function of
the law.
But the unelected branch is often loathe to stand on unpopular
grounds.10 5 The United States Supreme Court should direct its ef-
102. In Gregg, for example, the United States Supreme Court cited Gallup and Harris
polls which concluded popular support for the death penalty. Gregg, 428 US at 181 n 25.
Similarly, in Weems the Court stated that the Eighth Amendments interpretation must
"acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened." Weems, 217 US at 378. See also
Furman, where it was stated: "In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are consti-
tuted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." Furman, 408
US at 383 (Burger dissenting).
103. See Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice 172 (Clarendon Press, 1981).
104. Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice at 172 (cited in note 103).
105. This is so even when it makes decisions such as Plessey v Fergusson, 163 US 537
(1896) (holding that segregation on railroad cars was not a violation of equal protection).
Compare Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954) (holding that school segregation
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forts at expanding the protections afforded to individuals rather
than jeopardizing our freedoms by bowing to public frustration at
crime. Although this comment has examined constitutional juris-
prudence in the context of the Eighth Amendment, the "evolving
moral standards" doctrine can be used to limit liberty and prop-
erty interests as well. If the Court can take fundamental rights
away merely because it feels the majority does not support the
right, it serves little purpose. It is then merely a less responsive
house of the legislature.
All protections afforded individuals under the purposely vague
provisions of the Constitution, such as "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," "freedom from unreasonable search and seizure," "freedom
of the press" and the penumbral rights, apparently may be elimi-
nated by the concerted efforts of a bare majority, of the Court act-
ing unfettered by precedent or history.
The words of the Bill of Rights are still an aspiration, but as
substantive law they are a thin reed upon which to rest our lives,
liberty and property. When fundamental liberty interests need to
be curtailed, is the United States Supreme Court the proper insti-
tution to do so?
W. Lindman
is violative of equal protection). Only political pressure can explain the Court's reversal. If
the Court may strike away such protections, even Brown's survival cannot be assured.
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